We could hear. Many messages were goodbyes to friends or loved ones. Mitsuo Fuchido and Masataku Okumiya, Midway. A large part of the outcome was due to Japanese complacency and failure of naval intelligence — they underestimated the strength of the forces available to the US, believing that it could only provide one carrier instead of two.
Thus, they did not assign to the invasion the full strength that was available to them. The Japanese also made tactical mistakes — they wasted valuable searching hours while attacking a relatively unimportant target, the tanker. They also lost the gamble involved in searching for their targets during the late afternoon, resulting in the loss of irreplaceable combat-experienced air crew.
The Americans had the advantages of knowing what the enemy were planning, due to being able to intercept and decode their secret signals. The Americans had radar that could identify incoming enemy aircraft in time for them to scramble their own fighters into the air to attack them.
The Americans also had luck during their attack — the two Japanese carriers were about twelve kilometres apart and one was covered in cloud, so the US pilots could concentrate on one, free from the protective guns of the other. They destroyed theShokaku. The Japanese lost 45 of the 72 aircraft operational at the outset of battle on 7 May. The Allies sometimes needed that luck — as some of their weapons were decidedly inferior.
Then, even if the Devastators were able to release their torpedoes, they were likely not to stay on course, or if they did hit, not to explode! The slowness of the Devastator also meant that the aircraft dropping bombs arrived at the target before them, and had to wait to carry out their attack formation of simultaneous high-level bombing and low-level torpedo strikes.
The Japanese thus had time to disrupt the pattern and reduce its effectiveness. In the longer term, however, the Allies gained far more from the engagement than did the Japanese. The battle ended the proposed Japanese sea-borne invasion of Port Moresby. When they attacked the American fleet at Midway the next month, the weakened Japanese were met by a stronger Allied fleet than they had expected, and were defeated.
This was the end of Japanese naval power in the Pacific. In many people believed that Australia had been saved from invasion by the Battle of the Coral Sea.
A speech at the time by Prime Minister John Curtin makes this clear. Events that are taking place today are of crucial importance to the whole conduct of the war in this theatre. I should add that at this moment nobody can tell what the result of the engagement may be.
If it should go advantageously, we shall have cause for great gratitude and our position will then be somewhat clearer. But if we should not have the advantages from this battle for which we hope, all that confronts us is a sterner ordeal and a greater and grave responsibility.
This battle will not decide the war; it will determine the immediate tactics which will be pursued by the Allied forces and by the common enemy. Coming from duty one bright moonlit night, I noticed something strange about the shapes of some of the [mangrove] trees. And if you saw them, you certainly will not mention them to anyone else!
Many modern historians now claim that there was no Japanese plan to invade Australia, therefore the Battle of the Coral Sea could not have stopped this invasion. There is truth in this, though in a complex way. By early the Japanese had achieved their initial aim of having a defensible perimeter around their territorial gains.
But there was now disagreement between the Japanese Army and Navy leaders about what should be done next. The Navy, however, advocated either a direct invasion of Australia, or a western advance against India and Ceylon. Admiral Yamamoto had a third plan — to bring on a decisive naval confrontation against the United States as soon as possible, at Midway.
Yorktown, which the Japanese had believed sunk at the Coral Sea, was able to take part at Midway, but the two Japanese carriers had not been repaired. The Coral Sea thus made some contribution to the outcome at Midway, where the Japanese Pacific fleet was virtually destroyed. This opened the way for the Allies to regain all the areas that had fallen to the Japanese in the Pacific, though only after several more years, and enormous losses.
Each year since Coral Sea Week has been celebrated in Australia with marches by service personnel from both Australia and the USA, and official functions for visiting American dignitaries. These celebrations express gratitude to the United States for its part in the battle, and the support given to Australia by America in World War 2.
This now marks not only the Battle of the Coral Sea, but also the contribution and significance of all those who helped defend Australia at its most vulnerable time — the men on the Kokoda Track, the airmen in northern Australia and Papua, the sailors and merchant seamen keeping supply lines open, and the men and women in Australia in the services, as civilian workers, or volunteers on the home front.
The Coral Sea is habitat and a breeding site for numerous threatened and migratory cetaceans, turtles and sharks. Reef Check, Townsville. Ayling AM, Choat JH Abundance patterns of reef sharks and predatory fishes on differently zones reefs in the offshore Townsville region. Cunninghamia Pacific Science NPA News Coral Reefs, 11 3 : Coral Reefs Bongaerts P. Mesophotic coral ecosystems on the walls of Coral Sea atolls.
Coral Reefs, DOI Report to Department of Environment and Water Resources. Geography Monograph Series No 6. Australian Journal of Marine and Freshwater Research Scientific Background. Journal of Insect Conservation Review of Fish Biology and Fisheries Heatwole H Marine-dependent terrestrial biotic communities on some cays in the Coral Sea. Ecology Memoirs of the Queensland Museum Geography Monograph series No.
The Coral Sea action resulted from a Japanese amphibious operation intended to capture Port Moresby, located on New Guinea's southeastern coast. A Japanese air base there would threaten northeastern Australia and support plans for further expansion into the South Pacific, possibly helping to drive Australia out of the war and certainly enhancing the strategic defenses of Japan's newly-enlarged oceanic empire.
The Japanese operation included two seaborne invasion forces, a minor one targeting Tulagi, in the Southern Solomons, and the main one aimed at Port Moresby.
These would be supported by land-based airpower from bases to the north and by two naval forces containing a small aircraft carrier, several cruisers, seaplane tenders and gunboats. More distant cover would be provided by the big aircraft carriers Shokaku and Zuikaku with their escorting cruisers and destroyers. The U. Admiral Yamamoto regarded the raid as a mortifying personal defeat. The aircraft carrier Kaga 72 combat planes was originally allocated to take part in the operation but with the advancement of the timetable she had to be omitted as she was in dockyard hands till late April After completion of Operation MO the carriers were to rejoin the rest of the fleet and take part in the planned operations against Midway Island.
The Japanese plan was to initially seize the islands of Tulagi, in the Solomons, and Deboyne off the east coast of New Guinea. The intent was to use both islands as bases for flying boats which would then conduct patrols into the Coral Sea in order to protect the flank of the Moresby invasion force. The Japanese also believed that they would be denying the Americans the use of these islands for the same purpose.
The Moresby occupation force would sail after the capture of Tulagi on 3 May. As the Moresby occupation force entered the Coral Sea from the north it would be covered by the Carrier Striking Force which would enter the Coral Sea from the direction of the Solomon Islands. Prior to implementation, the operation was expanded to include the seizure of Ocean Island and Nauru after the capture of Port Moresby. Admiral Inouye had overall command of Operation MO. His forces were divided into several major groups:.
As a consequence of the ability to read Japanese naval communications traffic the Americans were almost as well informed on what was planned as the Japanese commanders. The problem was in the correct interpretation of that information.
C-in-C Combined Fleet today asked for a report on progress of repairs to Kaga. Comments 1. Armed with this information the Allies were able to concentrate much of their available striking forces in the Coral Sea area. As the picture of the intended Japanese plans began to develop Admiral Chester Nimitz, Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet, deployed his two available carrier groups.
The Yorktown group was returning to the Coral Sea after replenishing and conducting a short maintenance period at Tongatabu in the Tonga Islands.
This combined force, under the command of Rear Admiral Fletcher, was designated Task Force 17 and organised as follows;.
In the Pacific Fleet headquarters at Pearl Harbor a large chart of the Coral Sea area was laid out and staff commenced plotting the movements of the two opposing forces. An orange line traced the expected movements of the Japanese fleet, while blue lines showed the converging Allied forces. Again they did not cross the demarcation line and patrol the approaches to the Solomons. Information from these aircraft was first evaluated by local command staff and then what they considered relevant was passed onto Fletcher.
The fact that the Coral Sea battleground straddled two different operational commands did complicate matters. On 1 May, the two American carrier groups rendezvoused and began to refuel from their attendant oilers. The Yorktown group completed fuelling first and, when Rear Admiral Fitch advised Rear Admiral Fletcher that he did not expect to complete fuelling till noon on 4 May, Fletcher decided to move the Yorktown group further to the north west.
He advised Rear Admiral Fitch of his intention and of a new rendezvous. As the Americans were refuelling and attempting to position themselves so that they could intercept any Japanese naval forces, Shokaku and Zuikaku were sailing from Truk and by 3 May, as the Tulagi Invasion Group was landing, were north east of Rabaul.
With the successful occupation of Tulagi, Operation MO was well and truly underway. On receiving advice of the landings at Tulagi, Rear Admiral Fletcher turned the Yorktown group to the north east and increased speed to 27 knots with a view to launching strikes against Tulagi on the morning of 4 May. As Yorktown headed for Tulagi, Fletcher detached the tanker, Neosho and her escorting destroyer, Russell , to rendezvous with Fitch and Crace and advise them of his intentions as well as of a new rendezvous planned for the morning of 5 May some miles south of Guadalcanal.
By on the morning of the 4th, Yorktown was in a position to launch carrier strikes against Tulagi. The first strike arrived at Tulagi at about and attacked Japanese shipping in the harbour. A total of three strikes were launched by Yorktown against Tulagi. By the end of the day the Americans had sunk the destroyer Kikazuki , four landing barges and destroyed five floatplanes while damaging the minelayer Okinoshima and a destroyer.
All this was achieved at a cost of three aircraft, 22 torpedoes, 76 lb bombs and thousand of rounds of machine gun ammunition. While these strikes would have confirmed any suspicions the Japanese had as to the presence of American carriers in the Coral Sea, they also destroyed the Japanese reconnaissance capability out of Tulagi and so reduced the number of long range aircraft available to the Japanese, particularly in the north east Coral Sea.
On completion of the strikes against Tulagi, Fletcher retired to the south to rendezvous with Fitch and Crace. After making the rendezvous on the morning of 5 May Fletcher commenced refuelling his ships. On completion of refuelling Fletcher headed for the Louisiade Achipelago to intercept the Japanese forces he expected to pass through there en route to Port Moresby.
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